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both vis-à-vis regional and international powers and domestically, in state institutions, functions, and 
relations, begs the question of how conditions of structured exclusion affect the state’s ability to act 
autonomously and in the interests of the majority of its citizens? I argue that Shams al-Din’s discourse 
sought to reform the status quo by emphasizing a post-sectarian accommodative vision. The essence of 
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 State Sovereignty and Citizen Agency: The Nationalist-Islamic Discourse of 
Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din 
 
by Dina Jadallah 
 
Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din (1936-2001)1 is an important, 
but under-studied, Lebanese scholar and theologian. His discourse on questions of 
sovereignty and agency2 offers an alternative vision of modernity3 that is part of 
an evolving struggle by intellectual, political, and social forces in the Lebanese 
political system. That system is one of structured political sectarianism, otherwise 
known as consociational democracy.4 The consociational model in Lebanon 
divides all positions in the state based on a demographically-outdated formula 
purporting to be proportionally representative of the demographically multi-
cultural society (mujtama‘ mutanawwi‘). The formula is an instrument to 
distribute power, fixing roles (and positions) for the various demographic 
communal groups.5  
 This paper asks how political and ideational challenge – in the sense of 
empowering a disempowered group – occurs within the context of a putatively 
democratic state that employs constitutional and political structures designed to 
maintain a sectarian and unequal status quo. In other words, how can a 
marginalized group obtain social and political effectiveness by being able to act 
independently and make its own free choices (agency) within a dominant political 
system of democratic exclusion? In addition, the geo-political reality of 
diminished state-level sovereignty, both vis-à-vis regional and international 
powers and domestically, in state institutions, functions, and relations, begs the 
question of how conditions of structured exclusion affect the state’s ability to act 
autonomously and in the interests of the majority of its citizens? 
Using the discourse of Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, in this 
paper, I examine the intellectual, political, and personal spaces for the 
contestation of sovereignty. Sovereignty at the state level depends (even in 
dictatorships) on not just public behavioral compliance, but also on some degree 
of  ideational consent. Citizenship that possesses agency, in the sense of having an 
effective voice and a sense of ownership in the nation-state, fortifies state level 
sovereignty. This type of sovereignty is embedded in society: state legitimacy and 
authority are a function of the scope to which constituents in society are 
convinced that they have a vested interest in extant and predominant socio-
economic and political arrangements. This conviction of and adherence to the 
prevalent system is known in Gramscian terms as hegemony. It is analogous but 
not congruent with a (Rousseau-ian) social contract that reflects popular will. 
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 Even within a hegemonic system, however, there remains room – politically, in 
civil society, and so forth - for the agency of excluded groups as well as 
competition within the system, ideationally and politically.  
Lebanon’s sectarian-based system complicates both sovereignty and 
agency. Sovereignty is always a contested concept that is also, in application, 
continuously re-negotiated and re-defined, not only at the state level vis-à-vis 
other states, but also in the overlapping relationships connecting state and society. 
Affecting the debate (and material struggle) in Lebanon, are connections between 
domestic actors with external powers. Prime examples include relationships with 
Israel and with Syria. For instance, the Syrian presence in Lebanon that occurred 
in the wake of the Ta’if Agreement (1989) was due to an invitation by some in the 
political establishment who were searching for a way to end the civil war.6 
Lebanon’s external sovereignty was also violated by Israeli occupations and wars 
as well as by the creation of domestic stand-ins, such as the South Lebanon Army. 
External contestation of Lebanese territorial sovereignty continues, especially by 
Israel, which since its unconditional formal withdrawal in 2000, has subjected 
Lebanon to almost daily territorial transgressions and other violations.7  
Within the body politic, sovereignty’s internal dimension is a measure of 
the manifestation of citizen agency, or a person’s capacity for effective action vis-
a-vis the self, social group(s), the state, and a myriad of other networked 
affiliations. Depending on the need for activation, agency may express particular 
or complex aspects of people’s identities. These choices depend on and affect a 
person’s relationships with the state (and state sovereignty). In Gramscian terms, 
the fields of contestation between person and state, between community and 
institutions, and between private and the public actions are facets of how 
sovereignty and agency relate to each other in terms of definitions of identity, 
goals, strategies for action, values, and norms.  
The sectarian-based consociational democratic system affected the domestic 
sovereignty of Lebanon. As such, religious discourse and practice is a fruitful 
place to examine questions of sovereignty and agency. Consociationalism 
imposed a sectarian (religious) identity for the negotiation, practice, and 
contestation of power. As such, it violates the unity principle in the state. It 
privileges the expression of the confessional component of complex identities at 
the micro-level. At the macro-level, it imparts a confessional gloss to what is, 
essentially and fundamentally, politics. Socially, politically, and organizationally, 
it empowers extant (feudal) power positions. The model makes sectarian 
identification integral to the search for and achievement of citizenship. By forcing 
confessional corporatization, the model structures the scope for effective actions 
by citizens in society and politics. A destabilizing (occasionally paralyzing) 
repercussion is that, by limiting the representation of complex, dispersed, and 
varied micro expressions of difference, confessionalism limits the state’s own 
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 ability to act effectively (sovereignty) because its underlying structures are 
necessarily internally divided and fixed in these divisions. Intra-communally as 
well, the political leadership most likely to prevail is the one that plays within the 
confines of the confessional system. Both of these effects negatively impact the 
agency of the individual citizen. Ussama Makdisi suggests a possible solution, 
stating that overcoming sectarianism requires an alternative vision of modernity.8 
Shaykh Shams al-Din’s is one such alternative (theological) vision. 
As in other countries, structural imperatives help shape the formulation of 
societal responses to and interactions with the Lebanese state. Scholars such as R. 
Shaery-Eisenlohr assign a high likelihood that predominant political parameters 
are adopted by all members of communal groups. The two principal arguments in 
her book are, (1) that for the Lebanese Shi‘a, religion is an integral part of their 
imagination of the national narrative and that their national self-conceptions are 
dominated by visions of morality, Shi‘i themes, and symbolism and (2) that the 
Shi‘a’s appeals to transnational solidarities, for example post-Islamic Revolution 
Iran, are rooted in their own nationalist agendas.9 In other words, she argued that 
local imperatives predominate over supra-national ties. While Shaery-Eisenlohr’s 
thesis is valid for a significant segment among Lebanese Shi‘a, these structural 
conditions are not totalizing in their effects. Some Shi‘a opted out of the sectarian 
formula as the basis of their nationalist narration. A contemporary example 
includes many Shi‘a communists and leftists who were active in the resistance 
against Israel following the 1967 War, and remain so until today.10  
Nevertheless, the manifestations of religio-nationalist responses that 
Shaery-Eisenhor discussed are important because they challenge theories positing 
that modernity necessarily entails secularism because nationalism is assumed to 
replace religion.11 In contrast, Shi‘i theological and corporate accounts of 
sovereignty, even when oppositional, are affirmative of their nationalism. As will 
be presented below, in Shams al-Din’s thought, the existence of secularism does 
not preclude religiosity. That type of oppositional imagination(s) seeks to 
reconstitute the state so that sovereignty emphasizes the historically-evolving, 
interactive, reflective, commonality-seeking, and Justice-focused will of the 
masses – where religions may constitute terrains of common ground.  
Shams al-Din represents one version of the religious imagination. His 
work sought contexts for identity construction that extend beyond the rigid 
confines of the Lebanese state system. His scholarship and activism exploited the 
gaps (of non-representation, diminished and prescribed frameworks for 
citizenship (muwātana),12 oppression, exploitation, non-accountability, and so 
forth) in the project of the dominant sectarian state. By expanding the state’s 
narrow territorial (and cultural) confines and by filling in the voids of Lebanese 
sovereignty, his vision aimed at enhancing national sovereignty via inclusion and 
agency of the individual in society.  
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  I argue that Shams al-Din’s discourse added to the intellectual debate and 
made political contributions, intended to (1) enhance the political effectivity of a 
marginalized constituency and (2) fashion consent by reforming, not 
overthrowing, the status quo. I further argue that Shams al-Din succeeded to a 
notable extent in accomplishing these ideational and political goals by 
emphasizing a post-sectarian accommodative vision. The essence of this vision 
emphasized the role of the resistance struggle (al-muqāwama) for truth, justice, 
and inclusiveness as integral to the achievement of muwāt ana or citizenship 
(ownership / voice in the nation-state) as well as nationalist sovereignty, both of 
which he contextualized historically and politically within open and constructive 
relationships with their broader Arab, Islamic, and Human milieus. 
 In this article, I argue that Shams al-Din’s idealistic but politically-
engaged vision drew on the Sunni concept of (consultation) shūra and traditional 
Shi‘i texts by Imam ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, especially ‘Ahd al-Ashtar and Nahj al-
Balāgha. While none of these can be classified as democratic in the modern 
procedural sense, he emphasized genealogical / historical antecedent attributes in 
these texts. These include, (1) insistence on public opinion as fundamental to 
informing just rule, (2) a formula of engaging all societal constituencies, and (3) 
stipulations of the rights and duties of all existing socio-economic sectors within 
the political body. Highly aware of Sunni thought, Shams al-Din framed just rule 
as an aspirational struggle and as a post-sectarian framework for political and 
societal organization based on taqrīb (searching for commonalities, propinquity) 
that stretches beyond borders. I contend that just rule is an aspirational struggle 
and goal, much like theoretically-idealized participatory forms of democracy. In 
this way, Shams al-Din tied a segmented ‘special’ (Shi‘i) interest to a redefined 
‘general’ (national, Arab-Islamic, and human) interest. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
 Shams al-Din’s scholarship and political activities are most productive 
when examined as part and parcel of an ideational and organizational struggle 
conducted within the context of Lebanese political system and civil society.13  
 According to Antonio Gramsci, civil society overlaps, but is not congruent 
with, the socio-economic bases of the state.14 It is the field where consent and 
submission to political power are developed and sustained. However, Gramsci’s 
view of civil society’s relationship with the state is not consistent. In describing 
Italy during the Interwar period, Gramsci defined the state as “political society + 
civil society,” as the balance between political society and civil society, and “in 
concrete reality, civil society and State are one and the same.”15 This conceptual 
latitude lifts civil society above Marxist economic determinism, giving it an 
ideological dimension. Gramscian interpretations of civil society are tied to the 
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 historical context of its emergence and to the correlation of powers that influence 
the social / national body. One interpretation sees civil society as a mediating 
agent between special (selfish bourgeois ruling) interest and general social 
interests. Alternatively, civil society is also a place where values are formed in the 
struggle for ideological hegemony (leadership, rule) among competing social 
classes. The ability of ruling power and state mechanisms to limit their 
competitors, implicitly by the use of violence, acts as a limit on this struggle. 
Nevertheless, people are capable of altering their conditions, potentially 
producing either transformist or reformist / revolutionary change. This is 
especially enhanced if the ruling bourgeois class cannot assimilate new elements.  
 Using Gramsci’s approach to analyze civil society in Lebanon, one can 
view the  theory as providing analytical insight or, alternatively, as setting 
reservations against civil society (because its organizations may not be 
autonomous). The debate about the roles of civil society ranges between seeing 
civil society as a separate social space that monitors and balances the domains of 
state, family, and market, on the one hand, and viewing the state as creating its 
own civil society, on the other. In the latter case, organizations that emerge 
merely represent alternative faces of ruling power.  
 Shams al-Din engaged the debate about the role of civil society in 
Lebanon by centering the question of civic engagement within a wide frame that 
is aligned with the prevailing nationalist progress and independence narrative. His 
challenge harked back to historical and socio-cultural principles and also offered 
competing interpretations and perceptions of political (and international relations) 
knowledge. His inclusive conceptualization of the general and national interests 
built upon Lebanon’s experiences and ideational accumulations, including the 
struggle for independence from imperialist powers as well as the struggle against 
Israel. Both moral objections and negative territorial and political repercussions 
influenced his definitions of what constituted the general interest. 
 Sham al-Din’s contributions to the competing debates for ideological 
dominance, from a Gramscian perspective, fall into the “war of positions” 
political struggle. In that struggle, civil society has a voluntary dimension, being 
driven by ideational beliefs. His activism, along with that of other scholars, such 
as Musa al-Sadr, Baqir al-Sadr, and Hussein Fadlallah created organizational 
spaces for grassroots mobilization around ideological positions. Shams al-Din 
advocated dialogue, debate, and political means of change in addition to popular 
mobilization (al-ta‘bi’a al-‘āmma), consciousness-raising (taw‘iyat al-’Umma), 
and organizational work. Notably, he was consistently keen to cite both Sunni 
fiqh, such as that of Rashid Rida, as well as Shi‘i fiqh (and Christian tenets as 
well) in order to present jurisprudentially-supported arguments that synthesize 
positions, offering commonalities that would help unite ideational values and 
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 political strategies of various communities. An important aim of his was to avoid 
internal divisions, fitna, in the face of external dangers.16  
 The resonance and import of Shams al-Din’s discursive contributions to 
the issues of sovereignty and agency were dependent on the nature of his 
activism, which maneuvered within pre-existing structures that both limited 
conceivable thought and illuminated potentially effective routes for political 
action. Moreover, they were limited by the extent to which the religio-civil 
organizations that he helped found could (1) set goals via inclusion, (2) surpass 
particularistic interests, and (3) focus issues around collective needs while 
building upon historical preferences.  
  
Shams al-Din: General Historical Juncture and Ideational Vision 
 
 Hegemony was not static in Lebanon’s consociational political sectarian 
system. Shams al-Din played a reformist role, with a project that targeted the 
Islamic and Arab world beyond Lebanon. His vision accommodated changing 
historical contexts and the evolving dialogue among people who constantly re-
assess the effects their conditions and their strategies. Two realities that exist(ed) 
when Shams al-Din was working in Lebanon are Israeli occupation and a political 
formula for ‘democratic’, but asymmetrical, political distribution of positions and 
power. The former affects formal state sovereignty, while the latter affects the 
quality of citizen ownership in the nation-state.  
 Specifically, Shams al-Din’s assessment of the present political system in 
Lebanon and of its effects on the state, sovereignty, and citizen agency were 
directly related to the source of legitimacy in rule. He drew a distinction between 
a secular (‘ilmāniyya) state versus a state without religion. According to him, 
secularism derives its legitimacy and authority from de facto power (shar‘iyyat 
al-sult a) and laws (shar‘iyyat al-qānūn).17 He added that, in Lebanon, pure 
secularism would mean the cancellation of religious institutions, both Christian 
and Muslim. That option would entail destroying Lebanon since it is presently a 
secular system that accommodates religion, for example in personal status laws. 
Even though theoretically that system may produce leaders who, once in power, 
do not rule from the perspective of sectarianism, the reality is that the sectarian 
system produces leaders who derive legitimacy from their sect. For Shams al-Din, 
that result is a disfigurement of a religious state. Given the historical juncture, he 
asserted that he was not proposing an Islamic state, but was not opposed to it 
either. In the final analysis, his vision is for a state that derived its legitimacy and 
authority from an ideological, spiritual, communally-reflective, historically-
responsive, and aspirational, unifying goal. 
Farah Musa’s18 interview-based biography gives an overview of how 
Shams al-Din had faulted the sectarian system’s propensity to cause sedition or 
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 problems among people (fitna) in addition to causing poverty and the mal-
distribution of privileges, responsibilities, and obligations. Furthermore, 
sectarianism prevented the possibility of real citizenship because it consecrated 
inequality into the organizational structure of society. This confessional system 
stands in sharp contrast to government by pluralist majority democratic rule that 
incorporates the principle of al-shūra, where citizenship is based on egalitarian as 
opposed to sectarian bases.19 According to Shams al-Din, the confessional 
formula limits the emergence of popular (majority) will. Especially in the past, 
but still true today, this functioned to the distinct disadvantage of the Shi‘a. He 
added that, politically, the Shi‘a were assigned a “ghost persona” (shakhs iyyah 
shabahiyyah), represented but politically-ineffective and assigned a non-
leadership role that could not alter, via legal / constitutional / and political 
structures pre-existing dominant arrangements nor have an equal ability to alter 
the future trajectory of the state.20 As such, the internal constituents of state 
sovereignty were unequally-represented. Structured political inequality and 
representation then diminished the ideational and effective power of the modern 
and democratic state narrative that would (ought to) legitimize rule (in the 
political, not religious sense). 
Before the rise of the resistance in the South and in the Biqa‘ of Lebanon, 
the Shi‘a were a captive audience for the feudal (comprador bourgeoisie) class of 
Mandate-designated and consociationally-confessionally-structured leaders. 
Perceptions of the Shi‘i community ranged, from exploitation, to marginalization, 
to objects of charity. After the resistance, however, a new (unifying) goal of 
liberation (personal, communal, political and territorial) emerged and became the 
ideational force underlying critical challenges – religious ones in the case of 
Shams al-Din – to the prevailing system. It was in response to this reality, and 
also in an attempt to stem the attraction of leftist and secular political organization 
for many Shi‘a that al-Sayyid Musa al-S adr and Shams al-Din decided to establish 
the Supreme Islamic Shi‘i Council (al-Majlis al-Shī‘ī al-A‘lā). According to 
Shams al-Din, al-Majlis combines all political inclinations and is a necessary 
organization to collect, connect, and interact, across political (and social) 
positions. It is also intended to deal with realities, to formulate goals that serve all, 
specifically, liberation from Israeli occupation and creating a just state in Lebanon 
with the goal of majority rule. Furthermore, its intent was to become a spiritual 
counterbalance to political (non-popularly-based) representation while changing 
the feelings of marginality that had grown among the Shi‘a which leftist and 
secular parties had been unable to erase for the community.21  
Shams al-Din’s response was, along with other Shi‘i scholars, part of the 
reformist theological movement that was engaging with political and social 
developments.22 Addressing modern political realities, al-Majlis al-Islāmī al-Shī‘ī 
al-A‘lā was the first religio-corporate organization to demand the abolition of 
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 political sectarianism in Lebanon. That goal was and is based on a fundamental 
vision: that non-sectarianism is a means to enhance citizen agency – sovereign 
ownership in the state – which, in turn, would liberate / empower national state 
sovereignty.  
 Shams al-Din’s political project was always engaged with and responsive 
to substantive (secular, modern) realities.23 His book, Nizām al-Hukm wa al-
Idārah fī al-Islām is the first Arab Shi’i text on the subject of modern Islamic 
government. He was well-read on and engaged with Sunni jurisprudential 
discourse. His critique of Sunni scholars like Muhammad ‘Abduh and 
Muhammad Iqbal, centered on their misplaced focus on educating Muslims in the 
fundamentals of religion (with modern interpretations) while insufficiently 
addressing the modern realities of political and cultural domination of Western 
hegemony. According to Shams al-Din, such lack of engagement, allowed 
oxymorons in the discourse of ‘Abduh. For instance, the concept of al-mustabidd 
al-‘ādil, permits disregard for the will of the people and concentrates rule in the 
person of the ruler. Shams al-Din’s reformist jurisprudential reasoning (ijtihād 
fiqhī) described the above concept and paradigm of ‘Abdu as “stagnant” because 
the deductive (istinbāt ) paradigm (of ‘Abduh) was disconnected from substantive 
realities which are ever-changing.24  
 Shams al-Din’s own discourse evolved over time. A prominent example is 
the shift in his stance from the 1980s to the time of his death in 2000 over the 
issue of Lebanon’s sectarian system. Whereas he had initially advocated the 
abolition of the confessional system in favor of majoritarian pluralist 
democracy,25 by the time of his death (and after the 1991 Ta’if Agreement), he 
had come to accept it. In fact, he argued that the sectarian system formed the basis 
– which can be built upon – for the continued coexistence of the various groups in 
Lebanese society and for the continuation of Lebanon as a state. In the public will 
(was āya) that he issued in the last two weeks of his life, he even went so far as to 
find potential benefit from the example of the Lebanese system to the Arab and 
Islamic world. He reasoned that the existing historical juncture in Lebanon and 
the Arabo-Islamic world necessitate current arrangements. He concluded, “after 
much cogitation,” that cancelling confessionalism in Lebanon would be a big 
“adventure” because it would threaten vested interests, which may then seek 
outside support, resulting in foreign interventions within the Lebanese political 
space.26 This concession raises questions about Shams al-Din’s conviction as to 
the universal and timeless applicability of the confessional system, especially 
because he simultaneously advocated the reform of confessionalism (without 
going into much detail about the specifics).  
 Shams al-Din’s discourse was responsive to its particular historical and 
political milieus even as it advocated evolution towards an Islamic “ideal,” 
enmeshed in its society and emergent from the historical process. This ideal 
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 would serve as a prescriptive and aspirational goal. The reasoning that Shams al-
Din used to justify this position iterated that the Quran itself established the 
formula for gradual tashrī‘ (legislation) due to the realities that the political 
society and the state at the time were in the process of formation. In Fī al-Ijtimā‘ 
al-Siyāsi al-Islāmī, he concluded that Islamic government and society are not a 
part of sharī‘a; rather, they are products of Islamic history in both its theoretical 
and practical dimensions. The only caveats that he added were that the form of 
political organization should not contradict Islam’s creed for society and that the 
overarching goal of preserving Islam should be maintained. There was, according 
to him, an ideational basis for the Islamic state which posits that the Muslim 
umma is in a state of continuous formation and growth. As such, it was not a 
hierarchically political state of sult a (executive power) and command.27 
 Shams al-Din accepted the democratic project as a qualitative jump 
towards freedom. That political format would make feasible what he called a 
“secular believing, non-religious state” (iqāmat dawla ‘ilmāniyya mu’mina bilā 
dīn) which allows freedom of religion, including its corporatized expression.28 
The resultant state would be a “mixed”, i.e. have an Islamic precedent in the 
category of the House of Treaties (dār al-ta‘āhud). Shams al-Din based his 
justification on the recognition that politics must be based on social realities. In Fī 
Al-Ijtimā‘ al-Islāmī al-Siyāsī , Shams al-Din discusses the civil (al-madaniyya) 
aspects of the state, and again, finds historical Islamic analogues to justify such 
civil-political arrangements. He argues that after the hijra of the Prophet to 
Medina, there were relations of citizenship (muwāt ana) with the Jews who 
constituted a part of society. The society that was established at that time was 
based on the principle of partnership in responsibilities (al-mushāraka fī al-
mas’ouliyyāt).29  
 Thus, Shams al-Din’s vision of the mixed state was an aspirational and 
ongoing practice that  has parallels in ideals of continuous participatory 
democracy, where democracy is more than a political system for governance and 
participation. The appeal and effectiveness of this type of mixed state depend on 
the ability to represent more voices in society. Analogously to his 
conceptualization of the ideal political state, Shams al-Din’s discussion of jihād 
for personal and societal justice also emphasized dialogue, interactivity, and 
historically-relevant awareness. That vision paralleled the evolutionary, reflective, 
and aspirational aspects of participatory democracy. Therefore, the ongoing 
(principled ideational) struggle at the levels of the evolution of both citizen and 
the state was at the center of Shams al-Din’s discourse.  
 Because Shams al-Din’s scholarship was consciously embedded within the 
historical socio-political context, his discourse contained nationalist and 
sometimes supra-nationalist dimensions. His argumentation was frequently 
intended to appeal to as wide an audience (not exclusively Shi‘i) as possible. In 
9
Jadallah: State Sovereignty and Citizen Agency: The Nationalist-Islamic Dis
Published by Iowa Research Online, 2013
 that respect, it echoed articulations by Muhammad Baqir al-S adr in Iraq, who also 
insisted that the Shi‘a qua Shi‘a are part and parcel of their (national) societies. In 
Lebanon, Shams al-Din worked alongside Imam Musa al-Sadr from 1969 until his 
mysterious disappearance in Libya, establishing not only Al-Majlis al-Shī‘ī al-
A‘lā, but also numerous social and cultural centers, such as Al-Ma‘had al-Fanni 
al-Islāmi, Ma‘had al-Shahīd al-Awwal li al-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyya, Madrasat al- 
Duhā, Ma‘had al-Ghadīr, and al-Jām‘iyya al-Khayriyya al-Thaqāfiyya. In terms 
of authorization, these scholars provided theological reasons that affected a 
distinction between two types of religious leadership: the first is universal 
leadership of the most learned jurist (al-marja‘iyya al-fiqhiyya); and the second is 
political leadership by the local person who is most qualified to lead his 
community (al-marja‘iyya al-siyāsiyya).30 Since the Lebanese system encouraged 
the development of sectarian-based institutions so as to articulate confessional 
needs and aspirations at the state level, there was competition among the 
institutions and personalities over who would potentially play this leadership role. 
Specifically, during the early 1990s, there were Shi‘i political parties including 
Amal (led by Speaker of Parliament by Nabih Berri), Hizbullah, the Supreme 
Islamic Shi‘i Council (first led by Musa al-S adr and then by Shams al-Din), as 
well as other prominent and politically active jurisprudents like Ayatollah 
Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah. 
 In the following sections, I  present the specific argumentation in Shams 
al-Din’s discourse on sovereignty and agency. I demonstrate his clear engagement 
with present realities and his adherence to a project of struggle towards an 
aspirational ideal. His vision, I argue, presents a potential alternative path for 
modern Lebanon that, because of its central focus on liberatory Justice and 
inclusiveness in a nationalist and supra-nationalist context, stands a chance of 
overcoming the (mal-)effects of political and social sectarianism while 
strengthening sovereignty, internally and externally.  
 
Sovereignty 
In the context of the nation-state, while the essence of religion may have 
remained the same, its social function changed. Secular or otherwise, religion 
became part of national ideologies. In Lebanon, and if one may over-generalize 
about the sectarian groups which are in no way monolithic, the Shi‘i community’s 
attempts to politicize and corporatize their identity in order to effect changes to 
the hegemonic power balances and structures of the state were, and sometimes 
still are, perceived as threats to the Libanism (hyper-nationalism) of some 
Maronites or to the more recent, some of the Sunni-oligarchy’s definition and 
orientation of Lebanon. While the sectarian system encourages individual 
assimilation into the structures of the dominant state-defined form of sovereignty, 
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 it discourages alternative politico-cultural mobilization and to a somewhat lesser 
extent, ideation. 
In the context of the above constraints, most of Shams al-Din’s discourse 
stressed that the real struggle is not between individuals of different sects and 
religions. Rather, it is between individuals and a sectarian system, which is an 
inherently unjust form of state-society. He did not believe that one can reform 
such a system because fundamentally, it produces non-sovereignty of the state. 
According to Shams al-Din, the sectarian consociational system created a 
superficial democracy that made Lebanon into a subservient agent of other 
nations. He further rejected the premise that sect is the only possible paradigmatic 
option for Lebanon. He argued that divisions based on sect, among others, are in 
truth aimed at (political dominance) al-tasallut  al-siyāsī of the few at the expense 
of everyone else.31 
This particular theological response espoused pluralist ideals of citizenship 
in a non-sectarian state, but simultaneously modified the predominant assumption 
that secularism is the prescription for progress. Resistant and/or counter-
hegemonic perspectives32 with the greatest potential, however, challenge 
prevailing arrangements by redefining problems (targets for struggle) and themes 
or concepts around which mobilization may occur. The ideational challenge 
centralizes general interests and develops inclusive and cohesive the identitarian 
goals, norms and strategies. People are more likely to willingly adopt the new 
vision if it incorporates and builds from existing social, ideational, and historical 
realities. 
Shams al-Din’s discourse drew upon the greater Arabo-Islamic context. 
For instance, in discussing Palestine, he inserted it into its bigger whole, the 
Islamic umma, adding that no one has the right or ability to change its inherent 
identity into anything but a Palestinian one. It’s identity as Islamic and holy exists 
beyond human time, and hence, cannot be negotiated or given away.33 Similarly, 
in defining the nature of the struggle against Israel, Shams al-Din referred to it as 
a “usurping entity that must be extirpated” and that it was a state from an Islamic 
or pan-Arab perspective. Rather, it is an occupying umma. Therefore, resistance is 
most effective from outside the framework of international political equations that 
could counter-act realist balance of power assumptions; traditional military 
structures are not effective since it is “not a normal state, but a base”; and popular 
war, relying on ‘our own authentic means’, is the preferable course of action. 
Furthermore, he advocated an aggressive and proactive creed (‘aqīda hujūmiyya), 
as opposed to a defensive stance. He added that those methods were responsible 
for getting rid of colonialism in the region.34 
On Lebanon, Shams al-Din stated that his reformulation of the question of 
legitimate political authority was necessitated by the particularity of the modern 
historical juncture of Lebanon and the Arab world, which were in crisis (of 
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 sovereignty). In Nizām al-Hukm wa al-Idāra fī al-Islām Shams al-Din argued that 
this state of crisis engendered an ideational counterpart, forcing the issue of how 
to activate Islamic thought (azmat taf‘īl al-fikr al-Islām ī). He insisted that the 
Quran emphasized the necessity of self- and collective criticism (naqd dhātī wa 
jamā‘ī) and that historically, this occurred in the discourse with the polytheists. In 
fact, the Quran commanded believers not to follow (blindly) the fathers (he cited 
Surat al-Baqara, 170:2). The risk of lack of criticism is that it causes hubris, so 
that those who possess power (sulta) believe that God authorized them to 
command and forbid. These people then expect obedience. (It is for this reason, 
that Shams al-Din analogously rejected the concept of wilāyat al-faqīh 
(Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists). For society, hubris of this kind, when 
extended by power-holders, inhibits creativity for fear of being accused of 
apostacy (takfīr). The resulting self-censorship is then a product of an alliance 
between political and clerical authorities. Moreover, he insisted that criticism is a 
required religious duty (farīda dīniyya wājiba) and that Islamic movements do not 
possess infallibility nor an infinite right to rule (wilāya). He added that there still 
remain issues that need (internal, from within the Islamic jurisprudential ijtihād 
tradition) development in accordance with the necessities of the historical 
juncture. Two examples include the position of women and addressing concerns 
about the project for a religious state among Sunnis and Shi‘a.35 
Importantly, Shams al-Din tied the lack of self-criticism at the ideational 
level to political practice. He argued that the absence of shūra contributes to the 
lack of criticism. Significantly also, he anthropologically connected the present 
lack of political consultative procedures to institutions that emerged at the time of 
the Caliphate and the Imamate. While the Caliphate fortified itself behind the 
institution of the ‘inadmissibility of reply / response’ (‘adam jawāz al-radd), the 
Imamate used the principle of infallibility (‘is ma). Both concepts sought to 
preserve prevailing systems of rule. He continued that unitarian tendencies (al-
naz‘a al-tawhīdiyya) that do not rely on the principle of voluntary and free 
compatibility or agreement (tawāfuq) repress differences and plurality (al-
tanawu‘āt) under the slogans of unity and unification. Furthermore, in the Sunna 
and in the Quran there is a shar‘ī basis for the right to difference (al-ikhtilāf) – 
which is natural and cannot be negated. According to him, these realities divert 
away from searching for Truth, Justice, and other ideals, while politically, they 
prevent compromise and the search for agreement (wifāq). Organizationally, in 
order to escape, he recommended opening a space for comparative studies so that 
judgment and synthesis come from within the debate as opposed to being imposed 
by outside standards.36  
The internally-driven debate concerning the above reconceptualization of 
the fundamentals of legitimate political authority that Shams al-Din advocated 
built upon traditional Shi‘i theology. While Shi‘i theology initially posited that 
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 legitimate political authority of the Infallible Imams fell into abeyance after the 
disappearance of al-Mahdi in the 9th century, since then, authority in religion and 
sacred law (al-sharī‘a) were transferred to Shi‘a jurists.37 Specifically, in the Shi‘i 
tradition, theologically and theoretically, the specifics of the concept of 
sovereignty are naturally derived from a basis in the Qur’an and the Sunna, as 
does the Sunni tradition. However, according to Shams al-Din, there are major 
differences that emerged from the conflict over the succession following the death 
of the Prophet. Belief in nass (that the Prophet designated ‘Ali as his successor), 
historically evolved in the Twelver Shi‘i tradition to indicate that there always 
exists an ultimate Divine power that exercises rule and serves as a guide to the 
people. Textually, too, the Shi‘i tradition developed important guidelines that are 
based on Imam and Fourth Caliph, ‘Ali’ Ibn Abi-Talib’s Covenant to his governor 
to Egypt, Malik ibn Harith al-Ashtar (‘Ahd al-Ashtar),38 which was intended to 
function as a constitution for just rule.39 
Shaykh Shams al-Din’s book on ‘Ahd al-Ashtar40 emphasized that public 
opinion serves as a monitor on the ruler – effectively restraining (a form of citizen 
agency through oversight and accountability) the power of the ruler. In addition, 
he linked the guidelines regarding accountability and injustice set down in the 
‘Ahd to draw lessons for contemporary concerns over al-mahsūbiyyat (when the 
ruler is in the service of interests other than that of the majority will of the 
people).41 Specifically in al-‘Ahd, the interests of al-‘āmmah (the public) cannot 
be sacrificed for the benefit of a few, al-khās s ah. Shams al-Din highlighted this 
theme as especially relevant in Lebanon because the confessionalism of the 
democratic system consecrates mahsūbiyya. Furthermore, he added that it is 
relevant in all countries where sovereignty is diminished and penetrated by 
external powers.  
Even with the assumption and belief that God is vigilant in punishing 
oppressors, Shams al-Din suggested a more immediate theologically-authorized 
prescriptive solution. He argued that a pro-active and revolutionary strategy to 
respond to the non-sovereignty of majority popular will (which he viewed as in 
line with God’s sharī‘ah) already existed in Islam. He posited that passivity and 
submission to injustice are not Islam: “Islam makes the simplest of Muslim 
obligations, the obligation to command the good and prohibit the evil; and it 
makes the best kind of jihad (for God and with God) “to say all the Truth to an 
unjust ruler.”” 42 According to him, a constitution embodying just rule would 
necessarily exist in a revolutionary political environment. This was, in fact, the 
historical context for al-‘Ahd. Imam ‘Ali recognized the fallen legitimacy and 
authority of the previous rulers. Consequently, ‘Ali advised that the new 
(revolutionary and just) ruler ought not retain individuals from the previous 
regime, for they are hated by the people. Nevertheless, in the revolutionary 
period, Shams al-Din argued that change is not to be undertaken simply for the 
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 sake of change. Some methods and laws may be good and those ought to be 
retained. The new organizational structure of governance and society must 
likewise retain good and competent people from the previous period. Otherwise, 
the revolution cannot be completed for lack of qualified individuals. Likewise, 
reforms must be undertaken with the advice of experts and with a planned 
methodology.43 This revolutionary spirit must consecrate justice (al-‘adl) which is 
the key to achieving both social stability and progress (taqaddum). This concept 
of justice is embodied in the stipulation of ‘to each his due without excess either 
in punishment or reward’. This furthers mutual trust (thiqah mutabādalah) 
between ruler and ruled.44  
Thus, Shams al-Din’s vision of non-submission to rule that diverges away 
from the platform of the general interest and away from the civilizational project 
as a way of life would come from within the larger ideational project of liberatory 
justice. The mechanism by which this vision is accomplished involves the 
centralization of political and normative dialogue and agreement through 
competent and complimentary roles and through participatory practices. Neither 
(just and stable) sovereignty nor agency can be achieved without the above. 
 
Sovereignty from the Ground Up: 
Shams al-Din’s Religious Reasoning for an Alternative Vision of 
Agency  
 
Undoubtedly, the historical process has generated multiple theological 
voices, authorities, perspectives, and nodes of intellectual production as part of 
general societal re-articulations of authority, justice, rule, and agency. Faced with 
Israeli occupation and state neglect, Shams al-Din and other Shi‘i theologians 
pursued strategies aimed at liberation of their land along with political liberation 
in terms of overcoming the Shi‘i community’s historically marginalized political 
status within the Lebanese state system. The aim was effectivity, the ability to 
transform what they perceived as the diminished and oppressive nature of state 
sovereignty.  
Shams al-Din was aware that corporate mobilization of marginalized 
groups – class, ethnicity, race, gender, and so forth – had the potential to be 
counter-hegemonic when it transgresses the confines of the dominant 
framework.45 Yet he also pursued other resistances that were affirmative. Those 
latter worked to reform the system from within, for example, by interjecting 
clerical debate into political discourse. One such area that remains an ongoing 
debate is the issue of women in society. Very briefly (due to space limitations) 
Shams al-Din used verse 71 from Sūrat al-Tawba (“And the believers, men and 
women, are protecting friends one of another; they enjoin the right and forbid the 
wrong, and they establish worship and they pay the poor-due, and they obey Allah 
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 and His messenger…”) as indicating their equality in political duties and rights in 
public life. Furthermore, because women also can command the good and prohibit 
the bad, since they perform s alat and zakat, they are equal in worship and in 
economic obligations. Their equality (in rights and responsibilities) derives from 
their submission to God and from obeying His and the Prophet’s commands. 
Shams al-Din further cited verse 12 in Sūrat al-Mumtahana: “Oh Prophet! If 
believing women come unto thee, taking oath of allegiance unto thee that they 
will ascribe nothing as partner unto Allah, …, nor disobey thee in what is right, 
then accept their allegiance and ask Allah to forgive them. Lo! Allah is Forgiving, 
Merciful.” This verse, according to Shams al-Din, where women give allegiance, 
is a material expression of their political standing that is significantly not a 
precondition for their Islam, to the head of government and of the umma, and 
where the Prophet accepted their allegiance and indicated that their political 
position is like men. (However, women are recused from Jihad.)  
In addressing the best political course for another marginalized group, the 
Shi‘i community, Shams al-Din’s discourse was similarly searching for common 
ground. The Shi‘a, especially when engaging in public displays and exercises of 
power and /or piety, have been accused of being anti-sovereign state, or against 
the dominant Libanism of the Maronites. Partly in response, but mainly out of a 
conviction that is evident from the corpus of his writings, Shams al-Din urged the 
Shi’a in his Was āya (2001) to reduce the intensity of their religious displays and 
to not “invent” ritual markers that distinguish and prevent them from integrating 
within their respective national societies.46  
The discourses of Shams al-Din, Hussein Fadlallah, Musa al-S adr, and 
others are specifically addressed to the marginalized regardless of sect or religion, 
even as they utilize Shi‘i iconography, symbolism, and historical-cultural 
heritage.47 In distinct contrast to traditional Libanism, their discourses are 
contextualized within the larger Arab and Islamic milieu (sometimes extending 
beyond those to global society). 
Many observers’ over-concentration on Shi‘i symbols detracts from the 
appeal and interconnection of the larger project of resistance (to oppression, 
subjugation, deprivation, and military attacks by Israel) that resonates with many 
segments in Lebanese (and the larger Arabo-Islamic) society. An example from 
Shams al-Din’s discourse reveals his awareness of this symbolic literal stumbling 
block, and his desire to transcend it. Shams al-Din’s speech delivered to 
commemorate ‘Āshūrā’ in 1981 stated that the meanings of ‘Āshūrā’ are multiple. 
Remembrance is not just for sadness or for non-contextualized knowledge (al-
thaqāfa al-mujarrada). Rather, it is an opportunity for growth and for re-
interpretations and new understandings. It is simultaneously a rejection of 
injustice, a preservation of human dignity, a guardian for civilization, and a 
security for the future. He concluded by saying that it is the problem of 
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 humanity.48 Thus, he built upon existing cultural platforms and used those as 
prescriptions, tying them with modern general interests and with politics. In 
another speech entitled, ‘Āshura’ Thawra Dā’ima wa Mutajaddida delivered in 
1983, Shams al-Din asserted that ‘Ashoura’ is like Islam: it is a continuous 
historical revolution and is embodied in the stipulation (verse 104 in Sūrat Al-
‘Imrān) to be a people who command the good and forbid the wrong.49  
In another venue, Shams al-Din also sought to connect Shi‘i symbols of 
resistance and martyrdom to the following of Jesus.50 He called on Christians to 
return to the positions of Jesus against prejudice, racism, and ethnocentricity, all 
of which exist in Zionism today. He explained that Jesus’ life was dedicated to 
resisting the Israelites; Jesus resisted their claim to ‘chosen-ness’ and, instead, 
preached the equality of all of God’s creation. In this sense, both Prophets, Jesus 
and Muhammad, pursued the same dialogical openness to humanity. He further 
asserted that this attitude remained in Islamic fiqh and is evident in Islamo-
Christian history of tolerance in the Islamic empire. The above example by Shams 
al-Din demonstrates that his larger vision was of an integrated and diverse society 
that would defend against forms of injustice such as occupation and non-
sovereignty. 
For mobilization, Shams al-Din emphasized the need to connect and 
interact (a source of strength) across all political inclinations so that resistance can 
occur outside the framework of (unbalanced and unjust, power-determined) 
international political equations. One example of this type of non-conventional 
resistance that he extolled was the use of rocks by Palestinians during the 
Intifada.51 He asserted that this strategy was necessitated by the nature of the 
Israeli state. In a lecture delivered at the School of Law on March 25, 1988, 
Shams al-Din stated that Israel is not a state from an Islamic or pan-Arab 
perspective.52 Rather, it is an occupying umma (ethnically-self-defined group). 
For Shams al-Din, it is a usurping entity that is more a military forward base of 
colonialism (reminiscent of the French in Algeria) in the modern era.53 Hence, the 
need to resist in unusual, but authentic, ways. Another related type of 
organizational and practical resistance that Shams al-Din consistently advocated 
is the steadfast persistence of the people on their land in the face of Israeli 
aggression and attempts at usurpation.54  
Shams al-Din assigned higher priority to resistance against Israeli 
usurpation of Lebanese sovereignty than he did to Syria’s presence on Lebanese 
soil. This tension in his perspective on sovereignty can be attributed to his greater 
nationalist project for Lebanon, within its greater Arab and Islamic milieu. When 
asked in an Al-Jazeera interview to comment on this issue, he responded that the 
timing for raising this topic (2000) was inopportune and that he adhered to the 
position of the Lebanese state, as expressed by its President, that Syrian presence 
is legitimate. He added that this timing was subject to regional conditions, 
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 including those between Syria and Lebanon. According to him, it also fortified 
security and stability in both countries.55 Any decisions to remove the Syrian 
presence must be taken jointly, within the Lebanese political sphere, so that it 
becomes part of a nationalist, unifying, discourse. Above all, it must not add to 
internal fissures, especially sectarian ones.56 To that end, he advocated that the 
Lebanese Spiritual Summit, which combines all faiths and sects, be used in these 
discussions – as a supplement to the political process.57  
For Shams al-Din, therefore, resistance against external violations of 
Lebanese sovereignty ought to be chiefly directed at Israel. In fact, he stated that 
it was an imperative duty for people disaffected by Israel (and hegemonic 
powers). His discourse on this topic also relied on the symbolism from Karbalā’. 
His reasoning built on the essential meaning of martyrdom as a witnessing of and 
an adherence to a just cause that transcends the individual. Martyrdom unites the 
fate of the witness / martyr to the fate of humanity since its performance in life 
and in death serves to overcome the reification of the self. It, consequently, 
connects the self to the external struggle that is undertaken for the sake of the 
community (tanqul al-insān min damm al-dhāt).58  
This reformulation of Shi‘i symbolism can be considered as one of two 
different strategies intended to deal with the multi-confessional character of 
Lebanese political society. Shams al-Din promoted a strategy of al-taqrīb (the 
mitigation of inter-Muslim differences) and of al-tawhīd (the unification of 
Muslim believers in the umma) which propagates a critical, universalist 
understanding of religion. This strategy emphasizes common ground while 
playing down the distinctiveness of Shi‘i-specific practices.59 It promotes the 
universalist face of Shi‘ism and Islam and even speaks of the unity of mankind.60 
Towards that end, Shams al-Din heavily advocated and participated in the 
Organization for Lebanese Christian-Islamic Dialogue (Hay’at al-Hiwār al-
Masīhī al-Islāmi) and established an organization for inter-Islamic dialogue (Al-
Amāna al-‘Āmma li al-Qimmah al-Rūhiyyah al-Islāmiyyah). He also endowed Al-
Jami‘ah al-Islamiyyah in Beirut on a non-sectarian basis. That institution’s 
guideline is to become a force for change in society by nurturing and educating 
future generations on a Lebanese nationalist, Islamic, and public basis. Towards 
that end, it teaches secular and religious subjects. Within the religious field, its 
Kulliyat al-Ijtihād wa al-‘Ulūm al-Islāmīyyah focuses on comparative fiqh among 
the different Islamic schools or doctrines (mathāhib) as well as comparative 
religions more generally, as part of the project for taqrīb. Shams al-Din reiterated 
in his Was āya, that his project was based on the fundamental goal of Islamic unity 
that would reunite the Prophetic Sunna.61  
Counter-intuitively, by playing down differences while emphasizing 
similarities that cross classificatory systems, Shams al-Din’s strategy aimed to 
enable alternate agency, but not entirely outside of the dominant hegemonic 
17
Jadallah: State Sovereignty and Citizen Agency: The Nationalist-Islamic Dis
Published by Iowa Research Online, 2013
 narrative. Some of the institutions that he helped establish created opportunities 
for the expression of voices that may identify as religious, but resent being forced 
to self-represent within specific sectarian and confessional political structures. 
That structural groundwork in addition to his discourse, reflected an underlying 
conviction and liberation program that he was advocating. Namely, Shams al-Din 
posited an evolving complementarity between agency and sovereignty: 
sovereignty has an internal dimension while agency frequently relies on external 
overarching structures to assert itself. While various communities and individuals 
seek to mesh with their national society, the state ideally must also pursue, 
represent, and express policies and discourses that are as inclusive and / or 
responsive as possible so as to stabilize and strengthen its representational power 
and consequent authority.  
Shams al-Din’s discursive roadmap for a sovereignty-enhancement relied 
on a theological genealogy. At base, it built on the Qur’anic verse “God does not 
change a people until they change themselves” (Sūrat 13, Al-Ra‘d, Verse 11) and 
was supplemented with Imam ‘Ali’s hadith: “Know the Truth and you will know 
its people” (I‘rif al-haqq, ta‘rifu ahluhu).62 The strategy needed to engage with 
existing historical and political conditions and needs, which were limited by 
structural outcomes of Lebanese sectarianism. Namely, that only sects qua sects, 
not individuals (as independent citizens), can make claims on political power.  
Thus, it was not just the individual, but the nature of the state that needed 
to discursively evolve. Shams al-Din elaborated on the theological genealogy of 
Islamic political conceptualizations. In Fī al-Ijtimā‘ al-Siyāsī al-Islāmī: 
Muhawalat Ta’s īl Fiqhī wa Tārīkhī (1992), Shams al-Din discussed the structure 
and creation of Islamic society and asked why the Islamic state emerged. He 
concluded that the need to legislate (al-tashrī‘) necessitated(s) the state project, 
including its attendant processes of governance (hukm). In support of this 
argument, he cited historical and theological bases for hukm. For example, the 
hadith: “The one who dies without knowing the Imam of his time, dies in the 
ignorance of al-jāhiliyyah,” expresses the basis for the need for governance in 
Islam.63 The inclusion of al-jāhiliyyah in the hadith, refers to the all-inclusive 
nature of the Islamic political conceptual underpinning of a society that searches 
for a source of legitimate authority and legislative / jurisprudential production in 
historical context. In other words, Shams al-Din presents a historically-interactive 
source of political authority and a framework for tashrī‘. This conceptualization 
transcends politics. It goes beyond complementarities, interests, political 
effectiveness, and interaction. Governance here is equally of doctrinal creed (al-
‘aqīda) and religious legislation (al-sharī‘a). According to Shams al-Din, rational 
and substantive issues tie the socio-politics of society with individual spiritual 
depth, growth, and behaviors.64 Therefore, Shams al-Din saw the state’s main 
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 function as one of enabling ideational order where each individual can achieve his 
or her own humanity within a community.  
Along parallel lines, his conception of agency for the individual within the 
framework of an ideal, communal, and aspirational compatibility between 
sovereign rule and societal agency, relies on a religious genealogy. Shams al-Din 
builds on the Islamic conception of society as a society of sufficiency, equality, 
and social interdependence / complementarities (mujtama’ kifāya wa musāwāt wa 
takāful ijtimā‘i).65 Such characterization derives from the (social and financial) 
interdependencies underlying Islamic taxation, finances, and the economy. Thus, 
for him, conceiving society as a composite of necessary parts promotes unity and 
fosters a communitarian vision and an interdependence that would prevail over 
individually-based interests.  
Furthermore, in ‘Ahd al-Ashtar (1984), Shams al-Din emphasized that the 
overarching aim of rule is to work on the side of God (nas rat Allāh). This rule 
necessarily entails the institutionalization of truth and justice between people in 
rule (iqāmat al-haqq wal-‘adl bayna al-nās fī al-hukm). Institutionalization effects 
the Will of God in society.66 Institutionalizing the general interest (in truth and 
justice) is therefore related to agency and representation and to individual and 
group effectivity in society, in Shams al-Din’s discourse. In this schema, the best 
protection for a ruler is good work and public opinion serves to monitor the ruler 
and his methods of rule.  
Also relevant in terms of filling the gaps between the practice and project 
of governance / rule and that of lower-level societal agency, Shams al-Din 
interpreted al-‘Ahd and the government that al-Ashtar set up in Egypt as a 
revolutionary government (hukūma thawriyyah). He based this interpretation on 
several factors. First, that the ruler cannot disregard the will of the people but 
must “stay true to the principles of the revolution” (i.e. institutionalizing truth and 
justice) which that will expresses.67 Second, that accountability for the ruler(s) be 
sustained because passivity and submission are not of Islam. In fact, the simplest 
duties for a Muslim is to inveigh the good and prevent the bad; and the best jihād 
is to say the truth to an oppressor (kulluhu haqqun ‘inda sult ānin jā’ir).68 Third, 
corrupt remnants from the previous (non-revolutionary, unjust) regime are not to 
be retained for they are hated by the people.69 Fourth, competent individuals and 
experts are to be employed to ensure the execution of the revolutionary changes.70 
Fifth, administratively, the division of work and responsibilities in government 
was novel.71 Finally, that care for the needy (regardless of faith) is a responsibility 
of government and a religious obligation.72 All of these were revolutionary and 
innovative principles for their time.  
Shams al-Din emphasized these principles because they are part and parcel 
of his vision for the state, where renewal in the pursuit of Justice structures 
interactive and reflective relationships with accountability and responsibility. The 
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 above is a contextually-evolved historical explanation derived from the Shi‘i 
experience, but again, with relevance for the contemporary world. He emphasized 
that the revolutionary ethos is to be sustained. The focus on public opinion means 
that the ruler cannot obliterate the Will of the people (sahq al-‘irāda al-sha‘biyya) 
as had happened at the time of the third Caliph, ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan. Quoting 
Imam ‘Ali, Shams al-Din asserted that “You can distinguish the good people from 
the tongues (i.e. words) of His believers.”73 In other words, agency is possible 
because the opinion of the people is the metric by which good governance is 
judged. 
The rule side of the equation affirms that individual agency in the (free) 
pursuit of justice is part of an encompassing whole. The Islamic (and Shi‘i) 
conceptualization of the nature of the ruler-ruled relationship is guided by the 
overarching vision of the ruler as the father who is not the corrupt oppressor (al-
t āghiya). His rule is one of caring for the ruled: al-ri‘āya. It is not oppression: al-
istibdād. Therefore, rule is based on both justice and mercy, because while 
hierarchically the ruler is above the ruled, God stands above everybody.74 
Specifically, Shams al-Din used al-sharī‘a to assert the comprehensiveness of 
Islam, arguing that Islam is “all and one” (al-Islām kullun wa wāhid).75 In support 
of this argument, he cited from Sūrat al-Baqara (verse 85 asks believers if they 
believe only some of the Book, but disbelieve other parts?”) as well as Sūrat al-
Saff (verses 10-13) which ties the stipulation of jihād for God with money and 
persons.76 He further added that the sunna shows that people asked the Prophet 
about thousands of things, public and private, thereby indicating their awareness 
of their nature as a political society that inherently needs an authority (state and 
government). According to Shams al-Din, the political society deduced the 
legitimacy of this government from the Islamic legislation and from the Prophet’s 
rule and leadership.77  
A more Shi‘i-specific example with implications that transcend limited 
sectarianism was also presented by Shams al-Din. He cited al-Sharif al-Radi 
quoting Imam ‘Ali, who responded to the Khawarij claim of “No Rule except by 
God,” (la hukm illā li Allāh) with: “A word of Truth whose intent is Falsehood. 
Yes, there is no rule except by God. But they are saying no command, even 
though believers need a moral commander, or an immoral one, for whom the 
believer works.”78 Islam teaches that One God unites Muslims and has a vision of 
human unity pursuing the mission of the Good. He quoted from Sūrat al-Anbiyā’, 
verses 105-8: “And verily We have written in the Scripture, after the Reminder: 
My righteous slaves will inherit the earth: Lo! there is a plain statement for folk 
who are devout. We sent thee not save as a mercy for the peoples. Say: It is only 
inspired in me that your God is One God. We ye then surrender (unto Him)?”79 
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 This approach contextualized political activity within and under an 
overarching purposive idea. It connected doctrinal content, culture, economic, and 
the universal role to the ultimate fate in the hereafter. 
 
The Discourse of New Norms, Aspirational Goals, Strategies, and 
Structures: Institutional and Communal Relationships for Liberation and 
Resistance in Contemporary Lebanon 
 
Shams al-Din was aware of the deficiencies of state sovereignty in 
Lebanon compared to the multiple attributes of the standard modern conception of 
the state. That model posits a nation with authoritative rule and the Weberian 
monopoly on the use of force to enforce laws in a fixed territorial space. 
Fundamentally, he challenged Western allegations and assumptions that dispute 
the authenticity of and the modular modern relevance of an Islamic state. He 
singled out Bernard Lewis as a representative of that genre which tends to argue 
that the Islam’s lack of focus on territoriality voids the state concept. In response, 
Shams al-Din countered that Muslim jurists’ conceptions were more inclusive and 
comprehensive, conceptualizing territory within the larger perspective of its 
relation to the Umma (dār al-islām and dār al-harb / al-hiyād / al-ta‘āhud) and its 
mission as well as from the perspective of economic laws dealing with public land 
(al-kharāj and al-anfāl). Traditional Muslim jurists looked at land from the 
perspective of its relation to the umma and its mission and in terms of economic 
laws to deal with public land. Thus, while the Islamic umma may lack geographic 
specificity, it is based on an ideational hegemonic project.80 
Thus, Shams al-Din transformed the lack of geographic specificity into an 
asset for contemporary global and Lebanese contexts. He argued that the Islamic 
umma is not based on ethnic, linguistic, or sociological bases connected to the 
land. Rather, it is based on a belief in Islam and adherence to its doctrine and 
rules. It can, therefore, expand and is not exclusive. Dār al-Islām exists wherever 
Muslims are found.81 Nevertheless, this does not preclude the territoriality of the 
modern state (as opposed to umma). The state needs geographic definition 
because government has to do with political authority and the production of laws 
and rules.82 In jurisprudence, however, the umma can be conceived as a state 
without physical limits, because its growth does not necessarily coincide with 
authoritative government control.83  
These communitarian and constantly-evolving ideational dimensions of 
the umma state are (Gramscian-hegemonic) distinguishing characteristics that set 
it apart from the hierarchical political state of sult a and command (i.e. 
institutionally- and territorially-fixed rule in the modern state). 
In Nizām al-Hukm wa al-Idāra fī al-Islām, Shams al-Din explored Islam 
as a project for the state, rule, and order. Disputes over this issue, according to 
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 him, caused the largest differences that separate Muslims. Therefore, he sought to 
research the historical and philosophical contexts in order to synthesize Sunni and 
Shi‘i conceptions so as to make them relevant for the contemporary era and 
capable of overcoming the conditions of weakness, underdevelopment, 
imperialism, and subordination that oppress the peoples living within the Muslim 
umma. This project aimed at a true (social) revolution that changes conditions, 
social norms, and hierarchies in accordance with new ideologies and principles. 
The need for tashrī‘, therefore, continues in this project.84 
Despite the contemporary gaps separating authoritative government from 
those living under its rule, Shams al-Din suggested that the doctrinal adherence of 
citizens to a larger Islamic political entity may constitute an alternative unified 
and comprehensive view of sovereignty. That larger conceptualization is, at once, 
individually authentic while superseding the territorial limits of the state. Perhaps 
anticipating charges of promoting an alternate sovereign nationalism, Shams al-
Din insisted that an Islamic-based authentic identity is not confined within the 
state and does not mean enclosure and rejection of the Other. Rather, it seeks to 
preserve the identity of the larger mission from dissipation while remaining open 
to co-existence and co-operation with the other. On co-existence, he cited several 
verses. For instance, verse 125 in Sūrat al-Nahl: “Call unto the way of thy Lord 
with wisdom and fair exhortation, and reason with them in the better way…”; 
verse 8 in Sūrat al-Mumtahanah: “Allah forbiddeth you not those who warred not 
against you on account of religion and have driven you not out from your homes, 
that ye should show them kindness and deal justly with them. Lo! Allah loveth the 
just dealers.”; and verse 143 from Sūrat al-Baqarah in which the Islamic umma is 
described as “a middle people” (ummat al-wasat ).85 
Given his arguments for the embeddedness of al-sharī‘a within political 
society and historical context, as well as his belief that good government of nus rat 
Allāh transcends sect (and faith), Shams al-Din had a reformist position about the 
place for sharī‘a in the Lebanese state. He believed that the democratic project is 
a qualitative jump towards freedom. He agreed that a secular state was possible 
provided that freedom of religion is allowed and capable of corporatized 
expression. He therefore called for the establishment of a secular, believing, non-
religious state (iqāmat dawla ‘ilmāniyya mu’mina bilā dīn). Again, for him, the 
local context and basing politics in social realities mattered: Lebanon should not 
be a Christian Maronite state nor an Islamic state; it is a mixed state based on the 
Islamic category of (house of treaties) dār al-ta‘āhud.86 In short, politics in the 
Lebanese state must be based on social realities. Since such a state as he described 
above allows spaces for Islamic political organizations. Meanwhile, muslims can 
accept any form of organization that does not interdict the creed of Islam for 
society. What is important in these realities, according to him, is the ideational 
goal of the continuation of Islam in a united umma.87  
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 Despite the fact that Shams al-Din consistently insisted on substantive 
assurances to Christians88 (at a time when the Muslim majority was in the 
Lebanese opposition); and despite his arguments for democracy in a secular state; 
there may be some points in his argument that may be unacceptable or insufficient 
to some secularists and non-Muslims. First, his insistence on the corporatized 
expression for religion in the “secular” state, e.g. al-Majlis al-Shī‘i al-A‘lā, al-
Amāna al-‘Āmma li al-Qimma al-Rūhiyya al-Lubnāninyya, and al-Amāna al-
‘Āmma li al-Qimma al- Rūhiyya al-Islāmiyya, is contrary to secular demands for 
freedom from, not of, religion in the state. Second, assurances to religious 
minorities within the framework of a democracy may not be enough. In fact, it is 
perceived by some as a tactical step which may be reversed if power is attained by 
corporatized religious entities.  
The irony of religious figures and institutions calling for a secular state 
makes sense in a political consociational state that places certain groups at a 
disadvantage. A political system that consecrates sectarian and religious 
difference, at a time when society and state are in flux (as was the case in the 
Mandate period that created Lebanon), ensures mobilization along, and 
politicization of, these particularistic identities. Institutionalized political 
parameters influence the means available for mobilization. In the Lebanese 
context, these parameters were and remain confessional.  
Shams al-Din’s discourse reflects how religious categories can be utilized 
to achieve socio-economic and political goals. The category of ‘the deprived of 
the earth’ (al-mahrūmīn fī al-ard) figured prominently therein, acquiring 
relevance and became an ideational mechanism by which liberation (from within 
an authentic and internally-defined framework) would be pursued (agency) by the 
oppressed (Shi‘a and other). Substantively, the definitions of identity as well as its 
political, social, cultural, and economic aspirations and relationships, are based on 
Islamic and simultaneously Shi‘i exhortation to reject oppression and injustice. 
Those definitions, however, are part of a larger whole. Therefore, according to 
Shams al-Din, the Islamic principle of justice would be imperiled by the principle 
of absolute freedom (that characterizes, or at least claims to reside in, Western 
conceptualizations of sovereignty, for both the state and the individual). Absolute 
freedom, he pointed out, empowered the powerful and unjust in colonialism and 
neo-colonialism.89  
Shams al-Din did not see a contradiction between agency for all members 
of society and the achievement of an Islamic conceptualization of truth and justice 
through government. Instead, he outlined Islamic political society based in 
coexistence that was concomitantly pro-active, engaged with the world, and in 
accordance with human nature and God’s Word. That paradigm was possible, 
according to him, because the enjoyment of life and its bounty, and the optimism 
derived from belief in God, impact one’s relations with society. Furthermore, its 
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 actualization and success would be driven by its ultimate purpose: to create a 
society with a mission and purpose that adhere to society’s doctrinal and 
existential authenticity and that evolve within the historical, geographic, and 
political contexts.90  
It is perhaps unrealistic to expect agreement on a cohesive and unified 
mission for society that is simultaneously doctrinally- and existentially-authentic. 
However, Shams al-Din, like Musa al-Sadr, argued that it is practicable if the 
spiritual and existential qualities are rooted in extant and dynamic local 
circumstances and realities. Therefore, there is for Shams al-Din, and al-S adr, an 
Islamic meaning and component as well as an Arab meaning and context to 
Lebanese nationalism. Either one of these categories, Arab or Islamic, would 
cover the different constituencies of the specific Lebanese community.  
Moreover, the main mechanism for executing this difficult vision 
(especially because of its Islamic-based idealism) is his proposal for an 
institutional spiritual counterweight (discussed above) to facilitate dialogue and 
counteract the politicians. Shams al-Din assumed that politicians harbor more 
materialistic, and politically expedient interests than religious leaders. This 
assumption is debatable in the Lebanese context since many religious leaders 
have positions that closely adhere to political leadership. Nevertheless, Musa al-
S adr and Shams al-Din, through al-Majlis al-Shī‘ī al-Islāmī al-A‘lā, made a 
serious effort to initiate a dialogue that was unifying and inclusive while adhering 
to fundamental principles.91 It was a building block and access point for citizens 
towards the aspired-for state and government. In Shams al-Din’s discourse, an 
individual’s ability for self-realization as well as his or her ability to fulfill 
responsibilities that supersede oneself, depend on this vision of the state. In terms 
of Islamic genealogy, such individual potential to self-realize and to be effective 
is tied in Shams al-Din’s thought to the concept of al-hijra. Going beyond the 
obvious interpretation based on the Prophet’s and Muslim’s move to Medina, he 
characterized al-hijra as an enthusiastic, all-encompassing adoption of 
responsibility (iqtihām li al-mas’ūliyya) that takes oneself outside of narrow self-
interests (al-khurūj min al-dhāt). In order to effect hijra, one needs to overcome 
its inhibitors which are the desire for domination (al-raghba fī al-tasallut ) and 
being influenced by narrow interests (al-isti’thār). Such inhibitors capture the will 
so that decisions are not sovereign. In keeping with the revolutionary spirit, al-
hijra in terms of existential transformation, is a continuous process of trying to 
overcome a disjointed self-hood (al-dhāt).92  
Thus, the right constitution of the self is central to the (revolutionary) 
possibility of achieving a just – and consequently, sovereign – society. Hence, 
Shams al-Din’s emphasis on good conduct and moral character (al-akhlāq) as the 
structural elements that determine human relations with each other and underlie 
any societal organization, be it political, economic, social, and so forth. He 
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 derived this conclusion from God’s description of the Prophet as being of 
righteous and great character.93 Thus, the fundamental relationship between ruler 
and ruled is based on principled values (qiyam akhlāqiyya), which precede the 
legal principles or the power principles (al-qānūn).94 The relationship is based on 
an ideational core (a new hegemony) whose constituents include truth and justice 
and which must be performed in conduct. This relationship is activist and 
reformist for society as it transforms the self.  
The normative and ideational guidelines of the state had enabling 
procedural mechanisms. Ideationally, Shams al-Din distinguished the Islamic 
state by its mission, which he characterized as eternal and civilizational. This can 
be deduced from Qur’anic verse 16 from Sūrat al-Nahl, that earth and sky were 
built with Truth. Thus, Truth is the fixed organization of Creation and governs all 
things.95 Procedurally, while Truth is eternal, rule should be based on shūra. 
According to Shams al-Din, shūra constitutes the most important public, political, 
and constitutional principle for both Shi‘a and Sunna.96 Taken together, such a 
position by Shams al-Din implies that hegemonic, power, material, and 
institutional relations can be diverse and evolving, but the ideological mission is 
unified, eternal, and inclusive. Consequently, progress (al-tat awwur) and self-
renewal in this ideological mission of Islam can only happen from the inside and 
via ijtihād, whose purpose it is to deduce and / or reveal underlying undying 
Truths and rules.97 
This stance is fundamentally at odds with the concept of wilāyat al-faqīh 
that is practiced in Iran after the Revolution of 1979. Shams al-Din’s opposition to 
wilāyat al-faqīh, derived from his fundamental belief in wilāyat al-umma ‘alā 
nafsihā (the umma’s rule over itself). The shūra principle is fundamentally at 
odds with (1) the concentration of rule within the person of one man98 and (2) 
with the attribution of holiness to the political decisions of dominant power. To 
support his argument, Shams al-Din cited “He ordered shūra between them” (wa 
amarahum al-shūra baynahum) as an authoritative jurisprudential stipulation 
(hukm shar‘ī) and not as a descriptive statement. It is also an organizational and 
substantive principle that essentially distributes authority in society. To emphasize 
shūra’s importance, Shams Al-Din presented the Battle of Uhud in which 
Muslims were defeated. The Prophet had wanted to stay and defend the city, 
whereas the shūra of his companions advocated going out to fight. The Prophet 
abided by the shūra even though it contradicted his own opinion. According to 
Shams al-Din, this precedent is indicative of its centrality: in fact, may be deemed 
a politico-legal necessity for public issues – with the proviso that shūra does not 
contradict al-sharī‘a.99 Similarly, shūra was integrated in the “constitution” of 
‘Ahd al-Ashtar for administering the (revolutionary) government in Egypt. In the 
‘Ahd, Imam ‘Ali conceived and advocated revolutionary methods for his time, 
introducing the concepts of division of work (specialization), accountability, the 
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 independence of divisions, and the institution of al-kātib (employment and use of 
experts), among other things. All are to be supervised by the ruler, with whom 
ultimate responsibility resides, due to his possession of sulta (rule, a more secular 
form of power).100 Thus, there is a hierarchy of responsibility (and accountability) 
that corresponds to a hierarchy of rule. 
Therefore, religiously, there was no consensus over wilāyat al-faqīh. 
Many religious Shi‘i scholars, such as Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah (in 
Lebanon) and Abu al-Qassim al-Khu’i (in Iran) characterized it as a 
jurisprudential theory, unrelated to creed or to nationalist identity. They objected 
to wilāyat al-faqīh on the grounds of rejecting the interference of religion in 
politics. Shams al-Din rejected the concept in favor of wilāyat al-’Umma. Both 
his and Fadlallah’s rejections coincided with the end of the Lebanese civil war 
and the Ta’if Agreement in the early 1990s. Ideationally, the rejection established 
distance from post-revolutionary Iran.  
Ideationally, Shams al-Din used al-‘Ahd to highlight that (exemplary) 
government (power and sovereign rule) relates to citizenship (agency). The 
people’s right to decide their own destiny, interests, and aspirations is implied in 
Imam ‘Ali’s advice to al-Ashtar to be straightforward with people and to explain 
government politics, rule, and administration to people, especially on 
controversial topics.101 Therefore, (exemplary) rule, for Shams al-Din, implies no 
exclusivity of decisional authority to the ruler. Politically, Shams al-Din had other 
reasons to oppose wilāyat al-faqīh. The meshing of the religious with the political 
combined with the power asymmetry between Iran – under wilāyat al-faqīh – and 
Shi‘i populations in other parts of the world, would constitute a fundamental 
challenge to Shams al-Din’s project of a decidedly Lebanese nationalist vision for 
a new political society that was embedded within its larger Arab and Islamic 
contexts.  
Practically, given those political realities of trying to transform the 
dominant system and to reform it towards a new hegemonic vision, Shams al-
Din’s project aimed to generate, sustain, and fortify a particular type of resistance 
(muqāwama). In Lebanon, resistance is bifurcated between external and internal. 
Shams al-Din envisioned an ideational framework whereby the two can become 
unified in a communally-resistant relationships. The ability of that resistance to 
unite despite diversity would be due to the focus on the general interest goals and 
guiding values of pursuing Truth and Justice. Truth and Justice would, in turn, 
enhance the sovereignty of the state and of the person’s self-actualization within 
his or her state and society.  
Given the above frame, resistance occupied a substantial portion of Shams 
al-Din’s charitable and educational works as well as figured prominently in his 
intellectual output. The edited volume of his speeches and interviews on this 
subject, Al-Muqāwama fī al-Khitāb al-Fiqhī al-Siyāsī, presents not only his 
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 discourse on the topic, but also his engagement with the socio-political and 
strategic contexts from which the necessity for resistance emerged.102  
In Shams al-Din’s discourse, Palestine is central to resistance.103 
According to him, Israel serves Western anti-Islamic interests and is a form of 
neo-colonialism that prevents Arab unity and growth and represents an existential 
and religious threat.104 Significantly, he emphasized Muslim-Christian shared 
goals and stressed the need to preserve unity in the face of Israeli aggression in 
order to restore Jerusalem to its Arab fold.105  
It is on the burning issue of resistance that the gaps between state-level 
sovereignty (or lack thereof) and the will of the people, citizen agency, are most 
glaring. Shams al-Din consistently attacked these gaps, arguing that they are 
intentional products of the (artificial) divisions that separate Arab states internally 
and from the larger Islamic whole. The gaps are exploited by the West and Israel. 
Several of his speeches emphasized that official Arab state positions on Israel do 
not reflect the opinion of Arabs or Muslims, who will not give up on Palestine and 
on destroying Israel.106 In support of that assertion, he cited the Palestinian second 
Intifada, which showed that popular will diverged from political power, both 
locally and internationally. He said that the Intifada revealed the failure of the 
“lie” that “everyone was colluding in” about the “so-called peace process.” He 
added that political pressures to “end the so-called cycle of violence” are a trap 
designed to weaken the Palestinian position, ensconcing the (proposed) 
renunciation of armed struggle at a point in time when they are weak. In contrast, 
the Intifada placed Israel in an uncomfortable position, where it was facing more 
popular, mobilized, and organized will. He continued that no effort should be 
made to get Israel, “and those behind Israel,” a reference to the United States and 
Israel’s Western allies, out of this position. He contrasted popular Arab and 
Islamic responses to Israel with state and political ones. He added that the fissures 
are exploited by the West to impose a new “international legitimacy” that would 
cancel the previous rights granted the Palestinians by international resolutions, 
and additional ones that they possess inherently and that no one can take away.107 
Moreover, for Shams al-Din, the type of agency that is embodied in the 
muqāwama, necessitated a comprehensive focus. In addition to resisting Israel, it 
must also resist impoverishment and the marginalization of some segments of 
society.108 Such a conceptualization of agency / resistance acknowledged that 
oppression and injustice are not contingent and isolated entities, but 
interconnected and reinforcing loops. Consequently, al-muqāwama is an ethical 
and religious obligation that is not restricted to only some sects, but must be 
generalized, adopted by, and centralized in (all of) society. The resultant unity of 
spirit, attitude, and purposive action is the means to obtain true and effective 
sovereign independence.  
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 Resistance is not just ideational. Shams al-Din asserted the legitimacy of 
armed resistance (al-‘unf al-musallah) against Israel.109 According to him, an 
armed response to resist usurpation and colonization is not political aggression: 
“Defensive jihād is legitimate and obligatory without reservations, according to 
the Book, the Sunna, Reason (‘aql), and Consensus (ijmā‘) among Muslims.” 
Thus, the jurisprudential underpinning exists in all sources of Islamic law (Sunni 
and Shi‘i). He further added al-Muhaqqiq al-Hilli’s (Shi‘i) argumentation that this 
type of obligation to resist (jihād) persists even when there is no (apparent) 
Imam.110 Such a jurisprudentially inclusive argument is consistent with Shams al-
Din’s (previously-mentioned) advocacy of greater Arabo-Islamic unity. Just as 
Arab unity does not involve the dissolution of the many constituent states, 
Muslim unity does not mean obliterating religious differences. It does, however, 
mean unification vis-à-vis their enemies, including for Truth and Justice. In other 
words, unity needs a purpose.111 A contrasting sovereign relationship exists with 
non-aggressor states. Basing his argument on Imam ‘Ali’s ‘Ahd al-Ashtar which 
emphasizes peace and non-aggression, cooperation on the basis of justice and 
complementarities, adherence to treaties and covenants, among other things, 
Shams al-Din argued that foreign politics must entail complete freedom for the 
mission of Islam and its independence.112 
  
Conclusion 
 
Shams al-Din’s discourse on the inter-relationship between Islam, sect, 
faith, nation, state, sovereignty, and agency was an important strand within 
Lebanese Shi‘i (theological) leadership. This was the case both discursively, 
through his writings and speeches, as well as practically, through the many 
educational and philanthropic institutions that he established and through al-
Majlis al-Islāmī al-Shī‘i al-A‘lā . His conceptualizations of sovereignty and 
agency were informed by Shi‘i theology, but notably extended beyond traditional 
(sectarian and topical) boundaries. The specificity of the Lebanese context as well 
as his theological knowledge (and flexibility) shaped the parameters of his vision. 
Moreover, the lived reality of Israeli invasions and threats, combined with the 
diminished and/or illusory sovereignty at the state level, necessitated an 
embedded and interactive theological, organizational, and political response. 
Ultimately, the discursive and intellectual, as well as the practical and societal 
responses of Shi‘i theological leadership reflected and tried to structure efforts at 
the societal level seeking effective action, i.e. agency, within the state and against 
external and internal forces that undermine popular will. 
While pursuing effective authentic action in a sovereign state is an 
ongoing struggle, even within a democracy, in Lebanon, sectarian 
consociationalism complicated the effort. Shams al-Din’s organizational and 
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 discursive (political) response was based on a conception of underlying moral 
beliefs that guarantee a stronger form of sovereignty, based in a popular and 
participatory politics within a “secular-believing” state. The struggle was 
imagined as removing a system that harms many within various social and 
religious groups. In this sense, the Shi‘i struggle, both within the Lebanese 
political system and against Israel, is conceptualized as supportive and 
constitutive of Lebanese sovereignty. His vision suggested avenues for altering 
the supports of (political following / subordination) taba‘iyya, and of (diminished 
sovereignty or non-sovereignty) al-siyāda. Furthermore, Shams al-Din insisted on 
the importance of placing Lebanon within the larger Arab and Islamic context, 
arguing that it would derive strength from a potentially realizable unity of purpose 
against efforts to undermine sovereignty, in Lebanon and elsewhere.  
For him, this conceptual (confessional and societal) unity provides an 
authenticity that gives strength, protects, and does not dissolve (religious and 
national) differences. The unity is for the purposes of Truth and Justice and, 
simultaneously, a unification against common enemies. These guiding principles 
are historically-contextualized so that they remain as relevant at the level of the 
individual territorial state vis-à-vis its constituents, as they are at the extra-
territorial, but spiritual, purposeful, and existential unity. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Ayatullah and marja‘ Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din was born in Najaf, Iraq. 
Intellectual influences on Shaykh Shams al-Din include his most prominent teachers: al-Shaykh 
Muhsin al-Hakim (non-fiqh), al-Shaykh Abu al-Qasim al Khu’i (fiqh), al-Shaykh ‘Abd al-Mun‘im 
al-Fartousi (Balāgha), al-Shaykh Muhammad Taqiyy al-Irwani (usul), al-Shaykh Muhammad 
Taqiyy al-Jawahiri, al-Shaykh al-Ansari, al-Shaykh ‘Ali al-Fani, among others. Shams al-Din 
spent 35 years in Iraq, studying, teaching fiqh, and working on establishing mosques, libraries (for 
example the public library in Diwaniyyah), and charitable organizations. He was in favor of 
reform (tayyār al-tahdīth), working to modernize the curriculum taught in the religious schools of 
Najaf. In 1968, Shams al-Din returned to Lebanon and worked closely with Shaykh Musa al-Sadr. 
Together, they established al-Majlis al-Shi‘i al-Islāmīc al-A‘la (The Supreme Islāmīc Shi‘i 
Council). That institution was intended to provide an alternate organized voice for the Shi‘a in 
Lebanon, to aid the struggle against Israel, and to counteract the appeal of the Leftist political 
parties that dominated the resistance at that time. Musa, Farah, Ash-Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi 
Shams al-Din Bayna Wahj al-Islām wa Jalīd al-Mathāhib: Dirāsat Tahlil wa Muqāranah, (1993:  
Dar al-Hadi, Beirut), 34 (ft. 1), 35 - 48. 
2
 My defīnition of sovereignty (al-siyāda) is inspired from Shams al-Din’s writings on the subject, 
but combines elements from the standard defīnition that have relevance for the context of in which 
Shams al-Din was writing. In addition, my approach to sovereignty is informed by Antonio 
Gramsci’s (1971) concept of hegemony which articulated the capacity of the dominant state, and 
its benefīciaries, to structure the limits of resistance politically, economically, and ideologically. 
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Sovereignty is conceived as autonomous rule, with internal and external dimensions. Internal 
sovereignty refers to central state authority. It requires a source of authority, such as a king or a 
nation with effective power over the body politic. External sovereignty typically consists in 
recognition by other states, where a state has authority and the use of exclusive use of violence 
within a fīxed territory. The relationships between state and society, between authority and people, 
between the will of the sovereign and the ‘popular will’, remain problematic. (Sieyes, 1789; 
Machiavelli, 1532; Hobbes, 1660; Rousseau, 1762; Spinoza, 1670; and Locke, 1689) This 
problematic, commonly referred to as the sovereignty paradox, expresses the fīction of the ‘unifīed 
will’ of the ‘nation’ that is politically and hierarchically subsumed by the claim of a ‘social 
contract’ (Grotius, Rousseau, Hobbes, Locke) to either a ‘democratic representative government,’ 
to the authority of the ruler fīgure, or to a political party. The opposite end of the axis would result 
in a domination over the body politic that frequently entails suppression of heterogeneity and 
structural challenges. (Sieyes; Rousseau; Carl Schmitt, 1927, 2007; and Giorgio Agamben, 2011) 
The sovereignty paradox can also be a ‘democracy paradox’ if equality endangers liberty, say in 
majoritarianism. (Samuel Huntington, 1975; Chantal Mouffe, 2009; Jacques Rancière, 2007; 
Agamben) Pluralist democratic theories try to resolve this conundrum by assuming that the state is 
a ‘neutral’ vessel that processes all corporatized claims (J. A. Schumpeter, 1942; Robert A. Dahl, 
1961); or argue that the uncertainty (in free elections) synthesizes and / or alternates representation 
of variant positions over time. Typically, the structural (and normative) relationship is spelled out 
within the framework of a constitution. (Hannah Arendt, 1963, 2006) In Lebanon, the 
‘representative government’ part of democracy was structured along confessional (socially-
divisive) lines, privileging feudal leaders of confessional groups and freezing a political formula 
for government and representation regardless of demographic or other changes in the body politic. 
In addition, the neo-colonial origins and resultant domestic and international relationships and 
structural arrangements, have produced political systems with altered sovereignty. (Bacik, 
Gokhan, Hybrid Sovereignty in the Arab Middle East: The Cases of Kuwait, Jordan, and Iraq, 
(2007: Palgrave Macmillan, New York). In Arabic, sovereignty is generally described as sulta or 
siyada. It also extends to kingship (mulk), hegemony (haymana), control (saytara), and 
governance / rule (hukm / tahakkum). Shams al-Din’s concept of sulta is always de facto rule 
where there is no question of legitimacy. His concept of siyada, on the other hand, incorporates 
legitimacy. It combines elements of the above (democratic) aspiration to autonomous rule, with 
inclusive representation and inter-confessional as well as regional and Arab-Islāmīc reflective 
dialogue, which he conceived as evolving over time, guided within the framework of seeking 
Justice and Truth. See Shams al-Din, Muhammad Mahdi, Nizām al-Hukm wa al-Idāra fī al-Islām, 
(1955, 1991: Al-Mu’assassa al-Jami‘iyya li al-Dirāsat wa al-Nashr, Beirut), 33 - 35, 39 - 44, 50, 
186. Shams al-Din’s insistence on taqrīb, or bringing the various confessions and religions closer, 
is tied to creating an alternative ideological hegemony in government and in daily life, and his 
activism sought to convince and produce consent to this new vision, within a non-sectarian 
pluralist democratic system.  
 Mustafa Emirbayer’s and Ann Mische’s (1998) conceptualization of agency can be 
productively applied in analyzing the discourse of Shams al-Din in Lebanon. The authors defīne 
human agency as "the temporally constructed engagement by actors of different structural 
environments – the temporal-relational contexts of action – which, through the interplay of habit, 
imagination, and judgment, both reproduces and transforms those structures in interactive 
response to the problems posed by changing historical situations." (970) This approach 
conceptualizes the self as a dialogical and relational structure. (974) Agency is dynamic, interacts 
with various structural contexts of action, and is purposive. (963) This defīnition allows actors to 
mediate and change their relationships with structural contexts that stand “over and against” 
themselves and enables them to transform themselves and these structures. (964) A human actor 
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can move between teleological and normative action, in the pursuit of pre-established ends. In this 
schema, goals and strategy develop in a dynamic interplay over time and within contexts that are 
simultaneously evolving. Therefore, assessments of goals and strategy are always subject to 
reevaluation and reconstruction by reflective intelligence. (967-8) A fīnal advantage of this 
defīnition is that the placement of actors in multiple temporally evolving relational contexts allows 
for reflective consciousness. (969) Emirbayer, Mustafa, and Mische, Ann, "What is Agency?" The 
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 103 (4), (January 1998: 962 - 1023).  
3
 Makdisi, Ussama, The Culture of Sectarianism, (2000: University of California Press, Berkeley). 
4
 The model of consociational democracy was developed most extensively by political scientist, 
Arend Lijphart. It is conceptualized as a form of government for deeply divided societies and is 
used as a means for power-sharing and managing conflict. In Lebanon, the consociational model is 
based upon confessional lines, which were chosen and designated as the chief social divisions (as 
opposed to, for example, class or ethnicity). Such formulas for government, when non-responsive 
to demographic changes, risk consecrating and reifying societal divisions and perpetuating 
inequalities. Lijphart, Arend, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, (1977: 
Yale University Press, New Haven, CT). For critiques of Lijphart, see Lustick, Ian, "Lijphart, 
Lakatos, and consociationalism," World Politics, (2010), Vol.50 (1: 88 – 117). See also, Horowitz, 
Donald, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, (1985: University of California Press, Berkeley, CA).  
5
 The Lebanese state was created in September 1920 as a ‘refuge’ for the Maronite community in 
an overwhelmingly Muslim Middle East. The Mandate recognized the Shi‘a as a sect (ta’ifa) in 
January 1926. They did not become legal citizens of the new state until the colonial census of 
1932. Due to the structural design and the ideological defīnition of the new polity, the Shi‘a were 
viewed as marginal, extraneous, and / or inauthentic to the cultural and political “center” of 
Maronite-dominated Jabal Lubnān. A dialectical discourse emerged between the two Jabal(s) over 
the nature of citizens’ relation to and conceptions of the sovereign state. In 1943, the National Pact 
set up the sectarian political system of consociational democracy. It also set up a system for 
mediation, between citizens and state, where sectarian feudal leaders ‘spoke’ for individuals. 
Furthermore, the National Pact based the distribution of public goods and positions on a 
proportional formula that used (already outdated) census of 1932. The formula remains operative 
despite demographic changes. Shaery-Eisenlohr, Roschanack, Shi‘ite Lebanon: Transnational 
Religion and the Making of National Identities, (2008: Columbia University Press, New York), xi. 
6
 The fīrst to “invite” the Syrians into Lebanon after independence from the French Mandate was 
former President Suleiman Franjieh in 1976 shortly after the Lebanese civil war, purportedly to 
protect Christians. Syria was forced out in 2005 by a coalition of domestic political forces. 
7
 These include the July war of 2006, violations of Lebanese airspace, as well as kidnapping of 
Lebanese villagers and fīshermen. Since the ceasefīre in 2006, Israel has violated Lebanese 
airspace more than 7817 times, forcing Lebanon, in 2009, to fīle a formal complaint with the 
United Nations protesting these transgressions which contradict UN Resolution 1701 (2006). 
NOW Lebanon, “UN Security Council discussed Resolution 1701 report, Salam Says,” Now 
Lebanon, (March 29, 2011), http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=255780. 
Accessed August 7, 2013. Prior to the above, when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, Shams al-Din 
declared the obligation of jihad against Israel: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I52mTvnNFcY. 
Accessed August 7, 2013. 
8
 Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism, (2000: University of California Press, Berkeley), 174. For 
more on the Lebanese political system, the following are classical works: Cobban, Helena, Death 
of a Country, (1977: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London); Deeb, Marius, The Lebanese Civil War, 
(1980: Praeger, New York); Gilmour, David, Lebanon: The Fractured Country, (1983: St. 
Martin’s Press, New York); Hudson, Michael C., The Precarious Republic, (1968: Random 
House, New York); AbuKhalil, As’ad, “Druze, Sunni, and Shi’ite Political Leadership in Present-
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Day Lebanon,” Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 7(4), (Fall 1985); Ajami, Fu’ad, The Vanished Imam: 
Musal al-Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon, (1986: Cornell University Press, Ithaca); Khalaf, Samir, 
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 Shaery-Eisenlohr emphasized the role of Iran in producing a variety of Lebanese Shi’i 
nationalisms. Other scholars, for example, Brunner and Ende (2001) argue, however, that before 
the outbreak of the civil war in 1975, it was Lebanon that served as an important training ground 
and logistical base for those aiming to overthrow the Shah in Iran. A review of the literature of 
major Shi‘i theologians and activists reveals that the major parameters and themes of Shi‘a 
conceptualizations of sovereignty precede the creation of the Islāmīc Republic. Brunner, Rainer 
and Ende, Werner (eds.) The Twelver Shi‘a in Modern Times: Religious Culture and Political 
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